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Abstract. Some legal theorists say that legal entrapment to commit a crime is incoherent. So 
far, there is no satisfactorily precise statement of this objection in the literature: it is obscure 
even as to the type of incoherence that is purportedly involved. (Perhaps consequently, 
substantial assessment of the objection is also absent.) We aim to provide a new statement of 
the objection that is more precise and more rigorous than its predecessors. We argue that the 
best form of the objection asserts that, in attempting to entrap, law-enforcement agents lapse 
into a form of practical incoherence that involves the attempt simultaneously to pursue contrary 
ends. We then argue that the objection, in this form, encompasses all cases of legal entrapment 
only if it is supplemented by appeal to the premise that law-enforcement agents have an 
absolute duty never to create crimes. 
 






1. Legal Entrapment to Commit a Crime1 
Cases of entrapment involve an entrapping party, whom we call the ‘agent’, and an entrapped 
party, whom we call the ‘target’. Let the terms ‘party’, ‘agent’ and ‘target’ encompass both 
individuals and groups. The word ‘entrap’ is a verb of success: if A entraps B then A 
successfully entraps B. (It thus differs from a phrase like ‘to look for’: it makes perfect sense 
to say ‘I looked for it unsuccessfully’.)  
We draw two distinctions, which cut across each other, concerning acts of entrapment. The 
first concerns the status of the agent; the second concerns the act that the target performs and 
that the agent procures.  
Legal entrapment occurs when the agent is a law-enforcement officer, acting (lawfully or 
otherwise) in their official capacity as a law-enforcement officer, or when the agent is acting 
on behalf of a law-enforcement officer, as their deputy. When, on the other hand, the agent is 
neither a law-enforcement officer acting in that capacity, nor the deputy of such an officer, 
acting in their capacity as deputy, we have civil entrapment.2 
We distinguish between procured acts of criminal and of non-criminal types. An 
investigative journalist might entrap a politician into performing a morally compromising act 
that is not a crime, in order that the journalist might expose the politician for having performed 
the act. When the act is non-criminal but is morally compromising (whether by being immoral, 
embarrassing or socially frowned upon in some way), we are dealing with ‘moral’ entrapment 
(using the word ‘moral’ in a wide sense). When the act is of a criminal type, we have ‘criminal’ 
entrapment.  
 
1 This section summarizes REDACTED. 
2 For details of alternative terminologies for the legal/civil distinction, see (n 1) REF.  
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Thus, four types of entrapment can be distinguished: legal criminal entrapment (e.g., the 
police entrap someone into dealing in illegal drugs), civil criminal entrapment (e.g., a journalist 
entraps someone into dealing in illegal drugs), civil moral entrapment (e.g., a journalist entraps 
a politician into making an embarrassing boast) and legal moral entrapment (e.g. when law-
enforcement agencies, in their capacities as law-enforcement agents, entrap someone into 
performing a morally compromising act that is not a crime). Our concern in this article is with 
an objection to legal entrapment to commit a crime. Henceforth, we use ‘legal entrapment’ as 
an abbreviation for ‘legal criminal entrapment’. When this sort of entrapment occurs, we take 
it, the following conditions are all met:  
 
(i) a law-enforcement agent (or the agent’s deputy), acting in an official capacity as (or as 
a deputy of) a law-enforcement agent, plans that the target perform an act; 
(ii) the act is of a type that is criminal; 
(iii) the agent procures the act (using solicitation, persuasion or incitement); 
(iv) the agent intends that the act should, in principle, be traceable to the target either by 
being detectable (by a party other than the target) or via testimony (including the 
target’s confession), that is, by evidence that would link the target to the act; 
(v) in procuring the act, the agent intends to be enabled, or intends that a third party be 
enabled, to prosecute (or threaten to prosecute) the target for having performed the act.3 
 
3 We intend condition (v) to include blackmail cases in which the agent intends not that the target will be 
prosecuted, but that the target will be placed under threat of prosecution. Many writers hold (which we do not) 
that entrapment necessarily involves deception. These include: Gerald Dworkin, ‘The Serpent Beguiled Me and I 
Did Eat: Entrapment and the Creation of Crime’ (1985) 4 Law and Philosophy 17, 30, reprinted in his The Theory 
and Practice of Autonomy (CUP 1988), Chapter 9; Jerome H. Skolnick, ‘Deception by Police’ in Frederick A. 
Elliston and Michael Feldberg (eds), Moral Issues in Police Work (Rowman & Littlefield 1985) 81; John Kleinig, 
4 
 
Condition (ii) states that the entrapped act is of a type that is criminal. We are not here 
concerned with whether the target’s token act is one for which the target is criminally liable. 
In our experience, to say that the target’s token act is a crime suggests to some readers that the 
act is one for which the target is criminally liable. We seek to avoid this mistaken impression, 
and to provide a definition of entrapment that prejudges neither the question of the target’s 
criminal liability nor that of the permissibility of entrapment. 
 
2. Procurement and the Creation of Crime 
When defining entrapment, some theorists include a counterfactual (or ‘but for’) condition, 
according to which the target has been entrapped only if the target would not have committed 
the crime but for the agent’s actions. For reasons we have explained elsewhere, we do not 
consider it necessary or desirable to include such a counterfactual condition.4 Nevertheless, we 
note that while some theorists that include a counterfactual condition appeal to the token side 
of the type/token distinction, others appeal to the type side.5 On that approach, it is a necessary 
condition of a target’s being entrapped into committing a crime that, but for the entrapment, 
 
The Ethics of Policing (CUP 1996) 153; Seamus Miller and John Blackler, Ethical Issues in Policing (Ashgate 
2005) 104; Seamus Miller, John Blackler and Andrew Alexandra, Police Ethics (2nd edn, Waterside Press 2006) 
263; Hock Lai Ho, ‘State Entrapment’ (2011) 31 Legal Studies 71, 74. For full discussion and defence of our 
conditions, and of our omission of any deception condition, see (n 1) REF. 
4 See (n 1) REF.  
5 The token side of the distinction is adopted by B. Grant Stitt & Gene G. James in two articles: ‘Entrapment and 
the Entrapment Defense: Dilemmas for a Democratic Society’ (1984) 3 Law and Philosophy 111; ‘Entrapment: 
An Ethical Analysis’, in Frederick A. Elliston and Michael Feldberg (eds), Moral Issues in Police Work (Rowman 
& Littlefield 1985) 130. It is also adopted by Gerald Dworkin (n 3) 30. For a definition of entrapment that appeals 
to the type side of the type/token distinction, and which is therefore inconsistent with the conception of the creation 
of crime that we shall shortly advance, see Ho (n 3). 
5 
 
the target would not have committed any token of that type of crime. Thus, the approach cannot 
allow for the possibility that a target might be entrapped into committing a token crime different 
tokens of whose type the target was already inclined to commit. For example, the target might 
be disposed to commit crimes of a certain type, but not ones judged too risky. By contrast, we 
think that it is clearly possible that the target could, in theory, be entrapped into committing a 
risky token of this type of crime, by, say, the promise of great monetary reward. We agree with 
Stitt and James that precluding this possibility is a logically undesirable feature of the appeal 
to type-crimes in counterfactual conditions.6  
The type/token distinction is also relevant to the contention that legal entrapment is 
objectionable because it creates crime.7 In the context of entrapment, creation is to be 
understood, we take it, in terms of the creation of token crimes. Since a type of act can be illegal 
even if no one in fact ever happens to commit it, type crimes are neither created by, nor depend 
on, token crimes. For example, there is such a type of crime as murder, even if no-one ever in 
fact commits a murder, as long as a legislature outlaws it.8 
Regardless of the account of creation that is adopted, the incoherence objection to 
entrapment must rest on the contention that it is incoherent for law-enforcement agents (or their 
deputies), in their official capacities, to aim to create token crimes. In the literature, the 
counterfactual account of the creation of crime is popular.9 According to it, agents create token 
 
6 Stitt and James (n 5, 1984) 114–5.  
7 Some theorists that endorse this objection add that to entrap is to create, rather than to detect, crime. We shall 
shortly explain their view, and why we disagree with that element of it. 
8 A natural-law theorist would adopt the stronger position that actions like murder are still crimes even if no 
legislature actually outlaws them. 
9 E.g., Dworkin (n 3) 21, Stitt and James (n 5, 1984) 114, Ho (n 3) 74. Counterfactual accounts of the creation of 
crime appear (as in the case of Ho (n 3)) to be localized versions of the more general strategy of attempting to 
account for causation in counterfactual terms. 
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crimes if the token crimes would not have occurred but for their actions. This does not seem to 
be the right way in which to understand the creation of a token crime.  
 The analysis of creation in terms of the ‘but for’ counterfactual drains the notion of the 
creation of token crimes of the applicability that it is presumably intended to have when it is 
invoked in an attempt to advance the incoherence objection. That without which an act could 
not have occurred is not (even if itself an act) to be confused with the thing that happens to 
have brought it about.10 (Token crimes would not have occurred but for all manner of things: 
but for the existence of the criminal, but for the existence of the criminal’s parents, but for the 
existence of the victim, but for the meeting of the victim’s parents, and so on.) 
The notion of creation as we understand it must also be distinguished from that of having 
acted in a manner that, even if not necessary to the target’s commission of the token crime, 
made the target’s act more likely than would otherwise have been the case.11 In a decoy 
operation, the actions of the law-enforcement agents make more likely the target’s commission 
of the token act, and thus the situation meets the condition just mentioned. The actions of an 
agent posing, during a decoy operation, as a potential victim of a type of crime do not thereby 
amount to actions that, if a token crime is in fact committed against that agent, mean that the 
agent created the crime. If creation were to be understood so widely, then the incoherence 
objection would not be to entrapment per se. Instead, it would be a wider objection, to all forms 
of proactive law-enforcement that involve the active presentation to the target of an opportunity 
to commit a crime. We hold that creation goes beyond the mere presentation of an opportunity. 
On our account, to have created a crime is to have procured it. Entrapment involves the 
 
10 See further (n 1) REF.  




procurement of the actual commission of a crime, rather than mere presentation of the 
opportunity to commit that crime.12  
Let us explain the account of procurement with which we are working in condition (iii). 
For an agent to procure a target’s act is, we stipulate, for the agent to influence the target’s will 
through responsiveness, on the target’s part, to the content of a communicative act, or series of 
such acts, on the part of the agent. These communicative acts (which need not be spoken or 
written and can, for example, be gestural) persuade, solicit or incite the target.13 
The considerations in this section, along with our account of procurement, lead us to the 
following conclusion about how the notion of creation, as it features in the incoherence 
objection, is to be understood. For the agent to create a crime is for the agent to procure an act, 
on the part of the target, that constitutes a token crime. In procuring an act of a criminal type, 
the agent influences the target’s will (via the agent’s communicative act(s)) in order to bring 
about that act. 
 
12 For a different view, on which both entrapment and creation are conceived of more loosely, see Miller and 
Blackler (n 3) 107. On their conception, the mere presentation of an opportunity, such as leaving cash somewhere 
in the hope that the target will steal it, can count both as an act of creation and as one of entrapment. In our view 
the intentional presentation of an opportunity does not count as entrapment if it is not done with the intention that 
the target actually commit the crime. Andrew Ashworth seems to have a similar view: he writes ‘If test purchases 
are acceptable, they should be excluded from the definition of entrapment’, ‘What is Wrong with Entrapment?’ 
[1999] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 293, 297. 
13 The account of procurement in the law of England and Wales is somewhat broader. In Attorney General's 
Reference (No. 1 of 1975) [1975] EWCA Crim 1, [1975] QB 773, Lord Widgery defined procurement as follows: 
‘To procure means to produce by endeavour. You procure a thing by setting out to see that it happens and taking 
the appropriate steps to produce that happening.’ (Attorney General’s Ref. 779F). He allows to qualify as 
procurement of drink driving the surreptitious lacing of a drink without the driver’s knowledge. On our account 
this would not qualify as an example of procurement, unless the agent were encouraging the driver to drink the 
laced liquid. For more on the view that procurement and causation are distinct, see (n 1) REF.  
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3. Interpreting the Incoherence Objection 
There appear to be two broad ways of appealing to the notion of incoherence in relation to 
entrapment.14 The first focuses on the conduct of law-enforcement officials and it stays within 
the confines of the practice of law-enforcement. The second focuses on the workings of the 
criminal-justice system as a whole. It concerns the integrity of the criminal process leading 
from the pre-trial phase (law-enforcement/policing) to the eventual criminal trial. On the 
second approach, it is held that entrapment is a wrong or failing committed at the pre-trial stage, 
which renders incoherent the process of arrest, prosecution, and conviction of the target.15 The 
underlying motivation for this assertion, often defended in the form of the ‘integrity principle’, 
is that the criminal-justice system is composed of different parts that have to cohere with each 
other.16 Entrapment, when taken to be a wrong perpetrated at an early phase in the criminal 
process, would introduce incoherence between the different parts of the criminal-justice system 
and thereby damage its integrity: for the courts, so the argument goes, would not have proper 
standing to pass judgment on a defendant on the basis of a pre-trial investigation marred by the 
wrongful act of entrapment. 
 
14 For a summary of various objections, both legal and moral, to entrapment, see Jeffrey W. Howard, ‘Moral 
Subversion and Structural Entrapment’ (2016) 24 Journal of Political Philosophy 24, 25–28. 
15 See Andrew Ashworth, ‘Re-drawing the Boundaries of Entrapment’ [2002] Criminal Law Review 161; Antony 
Duff, Lindsay Farmer, Sandra Marshall and Victor Tadros, The Trial on Trial, Volume 3: Towards a Normative 
Theory of the Criminal Trial (Hart 2007) 242–7. 
16 For more on the ‘integrity principle’, see Andrew Ashworth, ‘Exploring the Integrity Principle in Evidence and 
Procedure’ in Peter Mirfield and Roger Smith (eds), Essays for Colin Tapper (Butterworths 2003); ‘Further Notes 
on Coherence in Criminal Justice’ in Petter Asp, Carl E. Herlitz and Lena Holmqvist (eds), Flores Iuris et Legum: 
Festskrift till Nils Jareborg (Iustus 2002); Andrew Ashworth and Mike Redmayne, The Criminal Process (OUP 
2010); Jill B. Hunter, Paul Roberts, Simon N. M. Young and David Nixon (eds), The Integrity of Criminal 
Process: From Theory into Practice (Hart 2016). 
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Despite its apparent clarity, there are many questions to be asked about the integrity-based 
interpretation of the incoherence objection.17 Our focus, however, will be upon the first kind 
of incoherence charge. Here the waters are much murkier. In particular, the exact nature of the 
alleged incoherence is, based on what has been written on the topic so far, difficult to grasp. 
Moreover, the objection is formulated, by those that advocate or mention it, in various ways 
that are apparently not all equivalent to each other. 
In this and the next section, we demonstrate that existing accounts of the incoherence 
objection (henceforth confined to the first approach) are diverse, and that, particularly over the 
question of the nature of the purported incoherence, they are far too imprecise. We aim to 
render more precise the various versions of the objection that are in the literature as well as 
some versions that, while absent from the literature, are interesting theoretical possibilities. To 
do so, we begin by considering Gerald Dworkin’s advocacy of the objection. Probing the 
objection as it appears in his work enables us eventually to settle on a new and relatively precise 
specification of the objection. We then argue that, from among the various interpretations of 
the objection that we canvass, this specification best maximizes the objection’s plausibility.  
 
A. Dworkin’s Incoherence Objection 
 
17 There are, perhaps, two obvious questions to ask: in what does the wrongfulness of entrapment consist, and 
why should we accept the integrity principle? On the latter, the previous footnote provides relevant references. 
On the former, generally speaking, the integrity principle has two parts: one that uses moral coherence (hence the 
‘wrong’ spoken of is of a moral kind) and another that uses coherence without the qualifier (hence the ‘wrong’ 
spoken of is of a non-moral kind). Entrapment is normally considered in connection with this second part, the 
failing being that entrapment creates crime (instead of, as we explain later, preventing it). See Duff et al. (n 15).  
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Dworkin’s version of the incoherence objection appeals to the notion of the creation of crime 
and, more specifically, to that of criminal procurement.18 His initial statement of the objection 
appears to be relatively clear: 
 
the law is set up to forbid people to engage in certain kinds of behavior. In effect it is commanding ‘Do 
not do this.’ […]  
But for a law enforcement official to encourage, suggest, or invite crime is to, in effect, be saying 
‘Do this.’ It is certainly unfair to the citizen to be invited to do that which the law forbids him to do. But 
it is more than unfair; it is conceptually incoherent.19  
 
This passage gives the impression that the incoherence is a case of utterance contradiction. 
Two utterances are contradictories when one is the negation of the other. Among utterance 
contradictions, we may distinguish between statement (or assertion) contradiction and 
(unconventionally, but usefully in the context) command contradiction. A contradictory pair 
of statements (or assertions) cannot be true together and cannot be false together. If two 
statements (or assertions) are in contradiction, then exactly one of them is true. A contradictory 
pair of commands, requests or bans cannot both be complied with, or both be flouted, by the 
same agent at the same time. If two commands are in contradiction then for any given agent at 
a given time, the agent is compliant with exactly one of them.20 While Dworkin appears to 
depict the incoherence at issue as a form of command contradiction, his suggestion readily 
 
18 Dworkin (n 3) 30–34. 
19 Dworkin (n 3) 32. 
20 It does not follow that the agent is obedient to exactly one of them. Obedience involves complying for the right 
reason. As Robert Paul Wolff puts it, ‘Obedience is not a matter of [merely] doing what someone tells you to do. 
It is a matter of doing what he tells you to do because he tells you to do it’, In Defense of Anarchism (2nd edn, 
University of California Press 1998) 9, italics original. 
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lends itself to construal, as follows, as involving a deontic-logical statement contradiction. On 
this construal, when the agent entraps, the agent suggests that the entrapped act is permissible. 
Given that the law debars acts of that type, the law logically implies the impermissibility of the 
entrapped act. Thus, what the agent suggests about the permissibility of the type act contradicts 
what the law implies about that permissibility. This statement-contradiction interpretation, 
however, suffers from the flaw that the attempted (or successful) procurement of a token act of 
a criminal type need not (and typically will not) involve any communicative act (or series of 
such acts) on the agent’s part such that its content implies the legal permissibility of the 
entrapped act. The entrapping agent will typically not be concerned to convey any message, or 
impression, to the target that the entrapped act is not illegal. Would a command-contradiction 
interpretation fare better? It would not, and for a similar reason. The procurement of a token 
act of a criminal type involves having a certain kind of influence, as explained in section 2 
above, on the will of the target. To command the target to commit the act is only one of many 
ways in which to attempt (or to achieve) this. So, to attain a plausible conception of the sort of 
incoherence involved in Dworkin’s version of the incoherence objection, we require a notion 
weaker than command contradiction. 
 In any case, in so far as our concern is with understanding wherein, precisely, the 
supposed incoherence of legal entrapment lies on Dworkin’s account, the above quotation sets 
us off, according to Dworkin’s own subsequent remarks in the piece, on the wrong path. While 
the quotation suggests an utterance-contradiction account of the alleged incoherence, Dworkin 
almost immediately announces that the incoherence objection is not to be construed this way. 
The piece, however, then characterizes the incoherence that is supposedly involved only in 
negative terms, leaving us none the wiser as to wherein, exactly, the supposed incoherence of 
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legal entrapment lies.21 A possible escape route from this situation emerges from a little more 
reflection on the command-contradiction interpretation. Given that the act that the agent intends 
the target to perform is of a criminal type, it is an act of a type that is legally prohibited. Thus, 
the law commands that it not be performed. The agent’s communicative act (or series of such 
acts) of procurement is intended to encourage the target to perform the act. It expresses an 
intention, on the agent’s part, that the target break the law. It is the agent’s intention and the 
law’s requirement that fail to cohere with each other: for the target cannot simultaneously 
satisfy them.22 
We offer this observation as a way of trying to convert Dworkin’s incomplete, and wholly 
negative, characterization of the relevant form of incoherence into something more precise. We 
believe, and argue over the course of this article, that the best prospects for the incoherence 
objection lie in the appeal to the notion of practical incoherence. In order to cast the objection 
in its best light, proponents of the incoherence objection ought to allude not to a formal or 
utterance contradiction or contrariety,23 but rather to the notion, recognized by Aristotle and 
within the Aristotelian philosophical tradition, of contrariety of ends. Two ends, such as 
enforcing a party’s observance of a law and encouraging that same party to disobey that law, 
are contraries when the attainment of one of them by an agent necessarily precludes the 
simultaneous attainment, by the agent, of the other.  
 
21 Dworkin (n 3) 32–33. Dworkin’s negative characterization of the incoherence consists in the denial that it 
involves either a ‘literal’ or a ‘pragmatic’ contradiction. 
22 Dworkin (n 3) 32 remarks that ‘it is not the purpose of officers of the law to encourage crime’ and he holds, 
further, that it is contrary to their purpose for them to do so. Thus, we take his to be what we shall call a ‘functional’ 
version of the incoherence objection.  
23 The difference between an utterance contradiction and an utterance contrariety is that an utterance contradiction 
occurs when the two utterances cannot both be true and cannot both be false, whereas an utterance contrariety 
occurs when they cannot both be true, thus leaving it open that they are both false. 
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This is, however, still not precise enough. In particular, we still need to get a grip on exactly 
wherein the aforementioned contrariety of ends consists: what exactly are the entrapping 
agent’s contrary ends? We can get to an answer by noticing, first, that Dworkin’s ultimate 
position does not seem to be that entrapment is always incoherent. Instead, he appears to hold 
that incoherence enters the picture when (but only when) law-enforcement agents attempt to 
entrap an individual that they do not have good reason to believe is already engaging in acts of 
the same type as the intended token criminal act.24 
Dworkin claims that random entrapment involves creating, rather than detecting, crime.25 
On his account, to entrap an agent that has not already been committing (or intending to 
commit) crimes of a given type, C, is to create a token crime that manifests neither prior nor 
ongoing criminal conduct (or intended conduct) of the same type. Dworkin appears to hold that 
to entrap into committing an act of type C a target that is already engaged in (or intending to 
engage in) criminal conduct of type C counts as genuine detection (rather than creation of 
crime). It seems, then, that, for Dworkin, creation of crime occurs when a target is entrapped 
into committing a crime that is of a type none of whose tokens the target was already engaged 
in committing (or intending to commit). Dworkin’s ultimate position is that it is the use of 
entrapment against people that are not already suspected of committing crimes (or of intending 
 
24 Dworkin (n 3) 33. We use hesitant language in making this statement about Dworkin because our interpretation 
of what he says relies on connecting incoherence to impermissibility. We reason that if Dworkin thought that 
entrapment were always incoherent then, plausibly, he would think it impermissible in all circumstances too. 
Instead, his position appears to be that entrapment is impermissible only in the cases he calls ‘virtue testing’. 
Ultimately, though, whether we are right in our interpretation of Dworkin makes no difference to the cogency of 
our argument. Note also that we use the phrase ‘virtue testing’ in a very different way from Dworkin; we use it to 
refer to the intentional presentation by the agent to the target of the opportunity to commit a crime where the agent 
does not intend that the target actually commit the crime. 
25 Dworkin (n 3) 33. Cf. Sherman v United States, 356 US 369, 384 (1958), concurring judgment. 
14 
 
to commit crimes) of the relevant type that is incoherent: for, on Dworkin’s view, creation is 
inconsistent with detection, and detection, but not creation, is a legitimate aspect of law 
enforcement. In short, the contrary ends for which we have been looking on the part of the 
entrapping agent are those of detection (of crime), on the one hand, and of creation (of crime), 
on the other. There is a question, however, whether it is really detection with which such cases 
of the creation of crimes are to be held inconsistent.  
 Recall that, on our account, when an agent procures a crime the agent has influence of a 
certain sort on the target’s will. To procure a crime is, we stipulated, to bring it about through 
solicitation, persuasion or incitement, that another commits that crime. Acts of solicitation, 
persuasion and incitement are communicative acts: these include, but are not restricted to, 
speech acts.26 To have procured a crime that a target has committed is to have inclined, via the 
content of such a communicative act, or series of such acts, the target’s will towards committing 
that token crime. Now, although a target may be already inclined to commit a crime of a given 
type, it is nevertheless possible for an agent to entrap such a target: a will that is generally 
disposed to committing crimes of a certain type need not be inclined on every single occasion 
when an opportunity to commit such a crime with an apparently low risk of being caught is 
presented, to take up that opportunity. In fact, even a record of convictions for crimes of a given 
type is strong evidence only of predisposition to commit crimes of that type: it is not the case 
that, for every relevant token of that type, it is strong evidence of a predisposition to commit 
 
26 Flagging down a taxi, for example, is a communicative act that is not a speech act. In this respect, it differs from 
a gesture of a sign language such as British Sign Language.  The gestures of BSL are part of an overall system of 
communication that possesses both a syntax and a semantics.  It seems to us that this cannot be said of such 
gestures as flagging down a taxi, waving or giving the thumbs up, at least when these gestures are not parts of an 
overall system of communication in which the symbols involved are type homogeneous (e.g., they are all 
inscriptions, or phonemes, or gestures) and in which there are formation rules for strings of them. 
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that token. It is therefore unclear whether the incoherence objection can really be restricted, as 
Dworkin seeks to have it, to cases where the target was innocent of the type crime prior to the 
entrapment scenario. 
 Let us clarify this further by providing a more formal representation of Dworkin’s position. 
Dworkin seems to appeal to the following principles:  
 
1. When legal entrapment occurs, the target is either already reasonably suspected of 
engagement, or of intending engagement, in crimes of the same type as the token 
entrapped crime, or not so suspected.  
2. If the target is not so suspected, then the agent is creating, or attempting to create, the 
token crime (whether or not it is traced to the target).27  
3. If the target is so suspected, then the agent is detecting the token crime (on the 
assumption that it is traced to the target).  
4. The agent cannot both detect and create (or even attempt to create) one and the same 
token criminal act. 
5. Creation (and attempted creation) and detection are contrary functions: thus, the 
creation (or attempted creation) of a crime by law-enforcement agents is inconsistent 
with their role of detecting crimes.  
 
The fundamental problem we see here is that Principle 4 is false: it is possible to detect and 
create one and the same token criminal act. When agents entrap, they help to create a token 
crime. They may also find evidence that links the target to the crime, in which case they detect 
 
27 It is possible that the target, unknown to the agent, is engaging in crimes of the same type as the token entrapped 
crime. In this case the agent is not, according to this principle, creating the crime but attempting to create it. 
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it too. If creation and detection are contrary functions, then this is not because it is impossible 
both to create and to detect the same token act of a criminal type—on the contrary, doing this 
is clearly possible. We conclude, therefore, that the incoherence objection cannot succeed if it 
appeals to the alleged incompatibility of creation and detection at the level of the target’s token 
act.  
 To make the incoherence objection work, we need, then, to find some other contrariety in 
the agent’s ends. Let us go back to our original idea: it is the agent’s intention that the target 
should perform an illegal act and the law’s injunction against that act that are incompatible, for 
the satisfaction of one necessarily precludes the simultaneous satisfaction of the other. 
Dworkin’s incoherence objection, when interpreted in the most charitable way, consists, we 
take it, in the assertion that the function of law enforcement is incompatible with, and therefore 
subverted by, satisfaction of the entrapping agent’s intention. Since, as we understand the 
concept of entrapment, it is impossible to entrap without having that intention, entrapment itself 
is functionally incompatible with law-enforcement. 
 The underlying incompatibility, we suggest, is not between creation and detection, but 
between creation and prevention. Since it is impossible for an agent both to prevent and to 
create a given token crime, but possible for that agent to do neither, we are dealing with a form 
of contrariety rather than a form of contradiction. Agents that procure a token act of a criminal 
type create it and have intended to create it. They have not intended to prevent it. The law 
expresses the intention that the act should not occur, while the act of entrapment expresses the 
intention that it should. 
 Nevertheless, the incoherence objection is too strong if interpreted like this. Law-
enforcement agents do not have a duty to prevent every crime that they possibly can. There 
will certainly be many occasions when law-enforcement agents have to choose between 
preventing two crimes, with the result that there is one crime that they do not prevent, even 
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though they could have done so. It would be incorrect to suggest that the law-enforcement 
agents are engaging in incoherent conduct, or even are guilty of dereliction of duty, if they 
intentionally allow a minor crime to occur in order to prevent a major crime. It may even be 
that the law-enforcement agents allow a minor crime for the sake of the possibility of 
preventing a major crime, as when they allow the boss’s minion to get away with something 
small in order that they might find out who the boss is. 
 Can this line of argument be employed concerning creation of token crimes, rather than 
permission of them? When law-enforcement agents entrap, they intend to create a crime, but 
for similar reasons to those already discussed: they intend to prevent a future crime or crimes 
by arresting the target and preventing the target from committing further offences. Or it might 
be that they intend to create a crime in order that the target might be punished for previous 
offences: perhaps when the target is under lock and key witnesses may be able to identify the 
target as the culprit behind other unsolved cases. The law-enforcement agent has the general 
aim (among others) of preventing crime or upholding the law: there are situations in which to 
reduce the overall amount of crime by the greatest amount the agent may have to create a small 
amount. 
 How can the proponents of the incoherence objection respond? One way is to accept the 
above and restrict the objection to just those cases of entrapment where there is no long-term 
aim of preventing crime. We think, however, that most proponents of the objection intend it to 
apply to all cases of entrapment; besides, it would make the objection more interesting and 
powerful if its scope were not restricted. What can its proponents say, then? 
 They could take a Kantian-style position that law-enforcement agents have a duty never to 
create crimes, and that this duty can never be suspended for any higher purpose. Although this 
means that there may be more crime in a state than there otherwise would be, blame for this 
regrettable fact is not to be laid at the feet of the law-enforcement agents. Rather, it is a potential 
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side-effect of any theory that denies that an action can always be justified if the consequences 
are good enough.28 
 We are not here attempting to answer the moral question of whether entrapment is ever 
permissible. We are merely seeking to show what must be believed in order for the incoherence 
objection to work. If the objection is to encompass all cases of legal entrapment, then we 
believe that it must involve the assertion that law-enforcement agents have an absolute duty 
never to create crimes.  
 
B. Summary, So Far  
In the course of our discussion of Dworkin, we have come across the following forms of 
incoherence and weighed each of them up as an interpretation of the alleged incoherence.29 
 Statement contradiction. According to this interpretation, when agents entrap they declare 
that a type of action that is legally debarred is, in fact, legally permissible. This is not a 
 
28 For further illustration of the strictness of the duty, its demands clearly spill over to undercover work. Take the 
case of an undercover officer that witnesses or even contributes to crimes, but does so in order to avoid blowing 
their cover. The Kantian duty, it seems, would also not allow this behaviour and, since undercover work is likely 
to involve such instances of permitting or even helping others to commit crimes, the Kantian duty would (severely) 
restrict (if not eliminate) undercover work.  
29 We do not claim that these interpretations exhaust the possibilities. For example, it might be claimed that the 
entrapping agents’ utterances are contrary to one of the agents’ law-enforcement functions, or that it is the 
utterances of the judge and/or the prosecution, if the case gets to court, that are contrary to those of the agents. 
We admit that these possibilities, among others that we have not discussed, are in principle available (although 
some of them, including this example, are covered by our setting aside of the integrity-based form of the 
objection). We have concentrated on what we take to be the more plausible candidate interpretations of the 
incoherence objection.  
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charitable interpretation of Dworkin’s objection, because it is untrue that entrapping agents 
must make, or even suggest, any such declaration. 
 Command contradiction. This interpretation has it that, when entrapping, agents enjoin the 
targets to commit acts that are of a type the criminal-justice system enjoins people not to 
commit. While perhaps more plausible than statement contradiction, this objection is also 
based on an exaggerated generalization. Entrapping agents need not go so far as to enjoin the 
targets to commit the acts. If the targets’ acts have been procured by solicitation, persuasion or 
incitement on the agents’ part, then it does not follow that the agents have specifically enjoined 
the targets to commit them: even if incitement is constituted by, or involves enjoining the 
targets to commit the acts, solicitation and persuasion can be subtle forms of encouragement 
that need not involve going so far as enjoining the targets to commit the acts. For example, a 
communicative act that is intended to ‘nudge’ the target, and succeeds in doing this, can procure 
the act.  
The two forms of contradiction listed so far are both cases of utterance-contradiction. 
This provides what is the strongest form of the incoherence objection from a logical point of 
view, but which is consequently the weakest in terms of philosophical credibility. When two 
utterances contradict each other, this situation cannot be changed by the addition of further 
utterances. It could easily be written in statute that, while it were a criminal offence for civilians 
to abet or encourage someone in committing a crime, the police might do so in the context of 
attempting to bring someone to justice. If the incoherence objection had to be interpreted as 
involving an allegation of utterance contradiction, then it would be utterly implausible. 
Moreover, other, more plausible, interpretations are available. Thus, no utterance-contradiction 
interpretation should be adopted.  
Functional contrariety/contrariety of ends. When agents entrap, they pursue an end (the 
encouragement of targets to commit crimes) that cannot be pursued (by the same agents) at the 
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same time as their end of enforcing the law. The agents create token acts of a criminal type, 
and this is contrary to the end of preventing such acts. The latter end, in turn, is one that the 
agents have, whether it is present to their minds or recognized in their actions and intentions, 
in virtue of their offices as law-enforcement agents. It is part of the functional role of law 
enforcement to prevent, and so not to create, acts of a criminal type. This is the interpretation 
of Dworkin’s version of the incoherence interpretation that we have suggested is the most 
plausible. Unlike earlier candidates, this interpretation does not appear to rest upon a false 
empirical generalization about the behaviour of entrapping agents. In order for the objection to 
apply to all cases of legal entrapment, however, it has to supplemented by a Kantian-style thesis 
that this role can never be suspended in the short term for the sake of a long-term gain in crime 
prevention. 
 
4. Other Formulations of the Incoherence Objection 
We have argued that the most plausible construal of Dworkin’s version of the incoherence 
objection involves the idea that law-enforcement agents engaged in entrapment will lapse into 
a form of practical incoherence involving contrariety of ends. The objection rests on, we have 
suggested, the proposition that law-enforcement agents have an absolute duty never to create 
crimes. In this section we survey formulations of the incoherence objection in the work of 
writers other than Dworkin. Our purpose now is to assess whether any of these fares better than 
the version of the objection that we specified, via our probing of Dworkin’s account, in the 
previous section. We argue that this is not the case. Each such formulation either does not give 
us a readily workable version of the objection or is best interpreted as a less precise way of 
stating the objection in the form given in the previous section. 
 
A. Ashworth’s Incoherence Objection 
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Andrew Ashworth is another prominent supporter of the incoherence objection.30 The 
following remarks suggest a version of the objection:  
 
[When entrapment occurs] the entrapping officer has breached the internal rules of the police or other 
law enforcement agency, and may well have committed a crime. Entrapment will usually involve the 
inchoate offence of incitement, and may make the entrapper an accomplice to the substantive offence as 
a counsellor or even a procurer. The English Law Commission went so far as to suggest that there should 
be a specific crime of entrapment, which an officer would commit if he incited the commission of an 
offence and even if he intended that the completion of that offence would be prevented or nullified.31 
 
There are several suggestions in play here. We rephrase them in our own language, and by 
reference to the account of legal entrapment given in section 1: 
 
Rule breach: a law-enforcement officer that engages in entrapment breaches the internal 
rules of the officer’s law-enforcement agency.  
 
Criminality through complicity: to procure a crime involves being complicit as an 
accomplice to the crime; entrapment involves procurement; so, entrapment involves 
criminal complicity.  
 
 
30 Ashworth (see especially the works cited in n 16), is also a supporter (in fact, perhaps the most prominent and 
explicit supporter) of the integrity-based form of the objection, which we set aside at the start of the previous 
section.  
31 Andrew Ashworth (n 12) 310–11. See also Ashworth (n 15): notes 36–8 focus in particular on the contention 
that legal entrapment involves criminality on the part of the agent; for more on this see also Glanville Williams, 
Criminal Law: The General Part (2nd edn, Stevens 1961) 781–2. 
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Criminality through encouragement or assistance:32 usually, entrapment involves 
encouragement or assistance to commit a crime; encouragement or assistance to commit 
a crime is itself a crime. 
 
Each of these suggestions can be construed as providing a reason why legal entrapment might 
be considered, at least under certain circumstances, incoherent.  
If rule breach is intended as an empirical generalization, then it is easily seen to be false. 
There are law-enforcement officers in certain jurisdictions, such as China, in which neither the 
law-enforcement agency itself nor the law proscribes entrapment as being against the rules or 
a form of misconduct.33 Moreover, this goes not just for formal rules, but also for informal 
rules that are matters of ‘custom and practice’, or matters of ‘ethos’ without being formally 
codified or documented.34 
Rule breach appears more plausible when interpreted, rather than as an empirical 
generalization, as making the same essential point as Dworkin’s ‘functional’ version of the 
incoherence objection. On this construal, it is a rule internal to the practice of law-enforcement 
that law-enforcement does not involve entrapment.35 This is for the subsidiary reason, not 
 
32 Ashworth, writing in 1999, uses the term ‘incitement’, but the offence of incitement was abolished in England 
and Wales in 2008 under the Serious Crime Act 2007 s. 59. 
33 See Sijia Zhou, ‘Research on Entrapment in China—With Reference to the Experience in Canada’ (LLM 
Thesis, McGill University, 2013) <http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/-?func=dbin-jump-
full&object_id=121597&silo_library=GEN01> accessed 4 January 2019. 
34 Cf., for the distinction, Fred D’Agostino, ‘The Ethos of Games’, (1981) 8 Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 7.  
35 One might be tempted to construe this rule as a ‘practice rule’ in John Rawls’s sense (in his ‘Two Concepts of 
Rules’, (1965) 64 Philosophical Review 3). As we note below, however, it is perfectly possible to conceive of a 
law-enforcement agency with the sole function of investigating crime. Hence, this rule cannot be taken to 
constitute the practice of law-enforcement as Rawls would have it.  
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stated, but implicit in the above statement of rule breach, that to entrap is to procure a token 
crime, which procurement is incompatible with the function of law-enforcement, as this latter 
involves preventing, not creating, (token) criminal acts. Since rule-breach is intended as a 
general injunction that debars all acts of legal entrapment on the grounds of their alleged 
incoherence, it must appeal to a factor that is common to all cases of legal entrapment. We have 
already argued that it is not the breach rules, whether formal or informal, that is this common 
factor. In identifying procurement as the common factor, we are able to advocate, to some 
extent, on Ashworth’s behalf.  
There is another drawback, however, with rule breach as Ashworth states it. This is that it 
is too narrow to construe rule breach, as he does, as happening when an entrapping law-
enforcement agent’s conduct is inconsistent with the rules of the law-enforcement agency to 
which the agent belongs, or, as we prefer, as inconsistent with a principle internal to the practice 
of law-enforcement. To see this, note that a law-enforcement agency could be established 
whose sole function was to investigate crime, and perhaps also prosecute the perpetrators, with 
law-enforcement’s other functions being carried out by other agencies.36 There seem to be no 
rules internal to the practice of investigating crime that debar the creation of token crimes. This 
drawback can be remedied by widening the sort of rules involved. A very wide way of doing 
this would be to include all and only those rules that are internal to those functions that the 
practice of law-enforcement in general has, rather than to any particular branch of it or agency 
responsible for it.  
As a result of the above discussion, a full argument can now be reconstructed based on 
considerations inspired by the above quotation from Ashworth: 
 
36 Perhaps the Serious Fraud Office in the UK is an example of such a law-enforcement agency; compare the 
‘Statement of Principle’ at <www.sfo.gov.uk/publications/guidance-policy-and-protocols/#statement> accessed 
4 January 2019. 
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1. It is a rule internal to the practice of law-enforcement (as a whole) that law-enforcement 
agents do not create token crimes. (Premise) 
2. Whenever law-enforcement agents entrap those not intending to commit the crime in 
question, they create token crimes. (Premise) 
3. Whenever law-enforcement agents entrap those not intending to commit the crime in 
question, they breach a rule that is internal to the practice of law-enforcement. (From 
1, 2) 
4. To breach a rule that is internal to a practice in which one is involved is to engage in 
conduct that is incoherent. (Premise) 
5. Whenever law-enforcement agents entrap those not intending to commit the crime in 
question, they engage in conduct that is incoherent. (From 3, 4) 
  
The main flaw in this argument seems to be Premise 4. Let us give an example different from 
entrapment: can law-enforcement agents exceed speed limits and go through red lights at 
junctions when in pursuit of a dangerous criminal? The Police Federation of England and 
Wales once issued a letter that said: 
 
Police officers have a sworn duty to uphold the law and they must comply with that duty.  
 
They must also act in a way which is lawful. […] 
 
A typical response or pursuit drive is likely to involve the officer contravening traffic signs 
and or speed limits. A course of driving involving contravention of traffic signs and speed 
limits is very likely to fall within the definition of careless or dangerous driving. […] There 
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are no legal exemptions from the offences of careless or dangerous driving. Any such 
drives are therefore likely to be unlawful[.]37 
 
The correctness or otherwise of the legal statements in this letter is not our concern.38 What is 
of interest is that it seems to appeal to something like the incoherence objection: that the police 
know that they have a duty to uphold the law, and that, therefore, it is incoherent for them 
intentionally to break the law. Now consider a police officer that responds to the letter by saying 
‘it’s more important that I prevent a major breach of the law by catching a dangerous criminal 
than that I refrain from a minor breach of the law by not running this red light, so that’s what I 
intend to do’.39 Is this response incoherent? Premise 4 says that it is. It seems to us, however, 
that this can be maintained only if Ashworth adopts a strong Kantian stance to the effect that 
the duty of police officers to uphold the law is always and everywhere inviolable. 
Let us now turn to Ashworth’s other suggestions. Criminality through complicity can also 
be developed into a more substantial argument, as follows:  
 
1. Upholding the law is a general end/function of law-enforcement. (Premise) 
 
37 Tim Rogers, letter of the Police Federation of England and Wales (26 June 2017) 
<www.polfed.org/documents/Driver_Advice_Final_Letter_5_2017_(3).pdf> accessed 5 January 2019 (emphasis 
original). 
38 It should be noted that, under the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, s. 87, speed limits do not apply to police 
vehicles being used for police purposes (in England and Wales), and, under The Traffic Signs Regulations and 
General Directions 2002, s. 36, red lights do not apply to the emergency services in the same manner in which 
they apply to the general public. 
39 Compare this news story from Switzerland: ‘Swiss Policeman Fined for Speeding during High-Speed Chase’ 
(The Local, 29 January 2019) <www.thelocal.ch/20190129/swiss-policeman-fined-for-speeding-during-high-
speed-chase> accessed 16 February 2019.  
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2. Every act of entrapment is an act that procures a token crime. (Premise) 
3. For every token criminal act that one procures, one is an accomplice to that token 
criminal act. (Premise) 
4. To be an accomplice to a token criminal act is to act criminally. (Premise) 
5. To act criminally is to fail to uphold the law. (Premise) 
6. Whenever a law-enforcement agent entraps, the agent is an accomplice to a token 
criminal act. (From 2, 3)  
7. Whenever a law-enforcement agent entraps, the agent acts criminally. (From 4, 6) 
8. Whenever a law-enforcement agent entraps, the agent fails to uphold the law. (From 5, 
7) 
9. Whenever a law-enforcement agent entraps, the agent’s conduct is contrary to a general 
end/function of law-enforcement. (From 1, 8) 
 
Again, the defender of entrapment is likely to respond that it is permissible to act contrary to 
the general end in one way if one ends up serving it (or even likely to serve it) in another way: 
in consequence, creation of a small crime may be justified in pursuit of prevention of a big 
crime or more than one crime. Once more, then, it seems that Ashworth must, if his version of 
the incoherence objection is to hold across all cases, adopt a strong Kantian-style stance that 
the end of upholding the law can never legitimately be breached in the short term in order to 
be achieved more thoroughly in the long term. 
When rule breach and criminality through complicity are spelled out in their more 
developed versions above, the differences between them emerge as minimal. Crucially, they 
both rely upon the contention that entrapment is incoherent because it is contrary to a general 
function/end of law-enforcement. The main difference between the two arguments is that 
criminality through complicity goes further than rule breach in that it also alleges a form of 
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criminality. This additional aspect of criminality through complicity (and the correctness of the 
corresponding grounding premises in the argument), however, is immaterial to our dialectical 
purposes in this paper. 
If the reference to incitement here is replaced by a reference to procurement (which 
includes, but is not limited to, incitement), then the resultant objection, criminality through 
procurement, extends to every act of entrapment (since, we are assuming, every act of 
entrapment involves procurement). There is nothing to be gained from advancing criminality 
through incitement as an objection separate from criminality through complicity, given the 
greater generality of criminality through complicity. When that same generality is obtained by 
replacing criminality through incitement with criminality through procurement, the latter 
appears to be a mere variant of criminality through complicity.  
The upshot of our discussion of Ashworth’s version of the incoherence objection is that it, 
like Dworkin’s objection, is most plausible when interpreted as resting on the appeal to a form 
of practical incoherence stemming from a contrariety of ends. Our interpretations of what these 
two theorists have to say about the incoherence of entrapment are thus in a relationship of 
mutual support.  
 
B. Howard on the Incoherence Objection 
Jeffrey Howard states the incoherence objection (without endorsing it) as follows: ‘the state 
acts inconsistently when it insists that citizens adhere to the law, but then takes measures to 
induce them to break it.’40 On this understanding, the alleged incoherence appears to be 
between, on the one hand, pronouncements or utterances of the state that citizens must adhere 
 
40 Howard (n 14) 26. 
28 
 
to the law and, on the other hand, actions, on the part of some of its agents, that are designed 
to encourage some citizens, in some circumstances, to break the law. 
Let us survey three ways to interpret Howard’s statement of the objection. First, it is 
familiar, as in the case of people that do not practise what they preach, that the pronouncements 
of individual agents may be at odds with their own behaviour. A television evangelist, for 
example, might condemn adultery in public, but practise it in private. This sort of incoherence 
is hypocrisy. Suppose, that, in virtue of its agents, the state can act.  The analogy with the 
television evangelist is straightforward only if the state, in inducing someone to break the law, 
thereby does what it itself condemns. In discussing Ashworth’s criminality through complicity, 
we saw that this might be the case, but it is not necessarily so: the special responsibilities of 
law-enforcement agents come with a certain amount of special licence that they have in virtue 
of their offices as law-enforcement agents.  
Howard’s exact formulation of the charge speaks not of the state’s breaking the law, but 
of the state’s encouraging its citizens to break the law. This suggests—and this leads us to our 
second interpretation of Howard’s formulation—that the incoherence, if any, of legal 
entrapment is not like that of the television evangelist mentioned earlier. Rather, it is more like 
that of a television evangelist that preaches against adultery but, without committing it, 
intentionally tempts someone else to do so, with the aim that this person will succumb to the 
temptation. Now, intentionally to tempt someone, in this manner, to do something that one 
declares to be wrong (in our case: criminal) might be hypocritical and criminal, as well as 
morally wrong. Whether it is incoherent, though, is less obvious.41  
Both the interpretations discussed so far assume that when legal entrapment occurs, it is 
the state (in virtue of its agents) that is acting. How about giving up this assumption? Doing so 
 




leads us to our third interpretation of Howard’s formulation. In this case, rather than 
understanding the incoherence objection in terms of the state’s doing something that is 
inconsistent with its pronouncements, which would involve entanglement in the issue of 
whether the state is itself an agent, it is perhaps better to view it in the following terms. When 
law-enforcement agents entrap someone, one group of state agents, namely the law-
enforcement officers (who are part of the executive), encourage the target to do something that 
another group of state agents, constitutive of the legislature, have deemed (in statute) to be 
legally impermissible or that a third group of state agents, consisting of the judiciary, have 
deemed (e.g., on the basis of case law) to be impermissible under the law. Read in this way, 
the incoherence involved in legal entrapment would not be one of hypocrisy focusing on one 
agent only, but would appear at the level of the criminal-justice system. This interpretation of 
Howard’s statement of the incoherence objection, however, would be reading it as just another, 
albeit perhaps weaker, formulation of the integrity-based form of the incoherence objection, 
which we have set aside at the start of our discussion. 
 
C. Carlson on the Incoherence Objection 
Jonathan C. Carlson asserts that ‘[f]or the government itself to encourage acts that could 
actually cause injury to the interests it wished to protect would be the height of absurdity’.42 
The idea here is that it would cause injury to the interests of the state if someone were selling 
illegal drugs, say, and that it would, in consequence, be incoherent for the government actually 
to encourage this injury by having its agent request illegal drugs from the target. But Carlson 
makes this assertion only to point out that it does not apply to most cases of entrapment: in 
 
42 Jonathan C. Carlson, ‘The Act Requirement and the Foundations of the Entrapment Defense’ (1987) 73 Virginia 
Law Review 1011, 1061. 
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many cases (e.g. when the agent pretends to be an assassin and encourages the target to place 
an order for someone to be eliminated) the forbidden act does not in fact take place, and the 
target is arrested for the offence of attempting to procure the forbidden act, and in other cases 
(e.g. when the agent buys illegal drugs off the target) the forbidden act occurs, but its harm is 
neutralized (because the drugs are destroyed, rather than consumed, by the agent). 
Nevertheless, there are some cases of entrapment in which the critique mentioned by Carlson 
does apply. For example, if an undercover agent encourages some bank robbers to rob a 
particular bank in which the police will lie waiting the agent may well know that the robbers 
will cause some harm (physical damage and shock to innocent bystanders) before they are 
apprehended. (This critique would extend to cases of pro-active policing as well, in which 
police might watch an area notorious for assaults in the hope of catching an assailant in the act, 
while knowing that they will not be able to stop the assailant before harm has been caused to 
the victim.) Although there is a prima facie case here for incoherence (‘absurdity’ in Carlson’s 
word), once again it seems to us that the argument requires a strong Kantian premise to the 
effect that it is never permissible to encourage a small injury to the interests one wishes to 
protect in order to prevent a bigger injury to them. Absent such a premise, it seems to us that 
the existence of incoherence or absurdity is not made out. 
 
6. A More Exact Formulation of the Incoherence Objection 
We have argued that the incoherence objection to legal entrapment by law-enforcement agents 
is best formulated using the distinction between the prevention and the creation of crime. 
According to the objection, legal entrapment gives rise to a contrariety of ends, and, thus, a 
prima facie form of practical incoherence. We can now provide a more exact formulation of 




1. The prevention of crimes is a general function of law-enforcement. (Premise) 
2. If the prevention of crimes is a general function of law-enforcement, then law-
enforcement agents must, on pain of incoherence, neither intentionally bring about, nor 
intentionally help to bring about, token crimes. (Premise) 
3. When an agent entraps a target, that agent intentionally procures a token crime. 
(Premise) 
4. If an agent intentionally procures a token crime, then the agent intentionally brings 
about, or intentionally helps to bring about, that token crime. (Premise) 
5. When an agent entraps a target, the agent intentionally brings about, or intentionally 
helps to bring about, a token crime. (From 3, 4) 
6. Given the general functions of law-enforcement, on pain of incoherence, law-
enforcement agents must not intentionally bring about, or intentionally help to bring 
about, token crimes. (From 1, 2) 
7. Given the general functions of law-enforcement, on pain of incoherence, law-
enforcement agents must not entrap anyone. (From 5, 6) 
On the assumption that the definition of entrapment upon which this argument draws is correct 
(and hence that Premises 3 and 4 are defensible) and that we are right that the prevention of 
crime is a general function of law-enforcement (Premise 1), the controversy is likely to centre 
upon Premise 2. Note that the consequent of Premise 2 is normative, for it states what law-
enforcement agents must not do. The key questions concern how the normativity is to be 
construed, and whether it is absolute.  
We think the following story might be told on behalf of proponents of the incoherence 
objection. The wrongness of practical incoherence, it might be suggested, consists in breach of 
a requirement of practical reason. But ‘requirement of practical reason’ is itself interpreted in 
two different ways, first as requiring structural rationality, i.e. structural requirements on our 
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attitudes, and, secondly, as requiring reasons for action.43 To take the first of these, is there 
structural practical irrationality involved in entrapment? There is an argument for that 
conclusion. Consider the following remarks from Thomas E. Hill, Jnr, on different forms of 
irrational practical incoherence: 
 
if certain means are necessary to an end, one must choose the means or else give up the 
end; to hold on to an end while refusing to take the necessary steps to achieve it is a 
form of practical incoherence. […] Similarly, it is generally a mark of incoherent 
(though possible) practical thinking to pursue goals that undermine one’s other goals or 
to employ means that violate the values that were the basis for choosing one’s goals.44  
 
The first requirement is given by what is called the instrumental principle. This can easily be 
met, however, by cases of entrapment: there is no reason to suppose that entrapment is not a 
means, and not chosen as a means, to an end, such as long-term crime prevention.   
The other two phenomena that Hill enlists do seem better candidates for the proponent of 
the incoherence objection, however. When law-enforcement officers entrap, they seem to go 
against one of the very values (crime prevention), and an associated rule (not to create crimes), 
central to their roles as law-enforcement officers. Nevertheless, the charge that this amounts to 
 
43 See R. Jay Wallace, ‘Practical Reason’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring edn, 2018) 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/practical-reason/>, esp. s. 4, and Niko Kolodny and John 
Brunero, ‘Instrumental Rationality’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter edn, 2016) 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/rationality-instrumental/>, esp. s. 1. Both accessed 27 
December 2018. 
44 Thomas E. Hill, Jnr, ‘Reasonable Self-Interest’, (1997) 14 Social Philosophy and Policy 52, 68 note 27. 
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practical irrationality seems to fall to the response that there is no irrationality in sacrificing 
short-term crime-prevention for greater crime-prevention in the long-term.  
Finally, then, let us consider an approach based on the idea that practical reason consists in 
requiring reasons for one’s conduct. Consider the following remarks from Thomas Scanlon:  
 
Being a good teacher, or a good member of a search committee, or even a good guide 
to a person who has asked you for directions, all involve bracketing the reason-giving 
force of some of your own interests which might otherwise be quite relevant and 
legitimate reasons for acting in one way rather than another. So the reasons we have for 
living up to the standards associated with such roles are reasons for reordering the 
reason-giving force of other considerations: reasons for bracketing some of our own 
concerns and giving the interests of certain people or institutions a special place.45  
 
Scanlon’s ideas could be applied to form an incoherence objection as follows. Good law-
enforcement officers are like good committee members—in virtue of their role, they have 
reason to do what prevents crime from happening, and, in virtue of the same role, any 
considerations that might otherwise have counted in favour of creating crime do not so count.46 
We could then say that entrapment involves a significant practical failing on the agent’s part 
since the agent is no longer responding properly to the balance of reasons in his/her case.  Still, 
it seems to us that this Scanlon-inspired theory fails in the face of the response that the 
considerations in favour of creating crime do not cease to count for the agent just because the 
 
45 Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (HUP 1998) 53.  
46 Scanlon defines reasons as ‘considerations that count in favour of adopting’ (n 45) 17. Considerations that are 
‘bracketed’ do not constitute reasons for a particular course of action, since, in virtue of their being bracketed, 
they do not count in favour of adopting that course of action.  
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agent occupies a law-enforcement role. They may count for less for the agent than they do for 
someone that does not occupy a law-enforcement role, but they do still count for something, 
and, it seems to us, they could count strongly enough to outweigh the considerations against 
creating crime. The only counter to this response, it seems to us, is the Kantian-style reply that 
the considerations against creating crime are insuperable. 
  
7. Conclusion 
We have considered in depth various formulations of the incoherence objection and have 
reconstructed them in detail and with considerably more rigour than we have come across in 
the literature so far. We have found an interesting commonality between the versions of the 
objection proposed by Dworkin and by Ashworth, namely that they both (in their most 
plausible form) depend on the contention that entrapment serves an end contrary to that of law-
enforcement. We have, however, also pointed out that obtaining the conclusion that entrapment 
is always incoherent would require a strong Kantian-style premise to the effect that the end of 
preventing crime can never be suspended in the short term for the sake of greater realization in 
the long term. 
The need to add this Kantian-style premise means that the incoherence objection cannot 
stand on its own, unaided by further arguments and assumptions, as an objection to all 
entrapment cases. Are there any cases in which the incoherence objection could apply without 
the Kantian-style duty, because of a particular aim or motive of the agent?’ 
Without further analysis it is hard adequately to answer this question; still, here are some 
initial considerations. It is fairly clear that if the agent entraps just to get promoted, say, then 
that is not a good enough reason to suspend the requirement not to create crime; incoherence, 
even if we do not assume a Kantian-style duty, would loom large here (given the assumption, 
upon which both the incoherence objection and our account of legal entrapment rest, that the 
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agent is acting in the agent’s capacity as a law-enforcement agent). Similar considerations 
apply if the agent entraps just so as not to get demoted, or just to achieve a certain set number 
of arrests in a set period. At the other end of the spectrum, we have the examples already 
mentioned: prevention of more, or more serious, crime in the future, and, also, arresting 
criminals for crimes in the past. Difficult cases might concern whether the end of preventing 
civil unrest, or of safeguarding life and limb, would be sufficient to avoid incoherence without 
assuming a Kantian premise. We do not here pass moral judgement on it; we just note that it 
would seem somewhat harder to escape the incoherence objection here than it would be by 
pleading the more idealistic approach of reducing crime in the long term. 
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